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GROUNDED: HOW THE 737 MAX CRASHES HIGHLIGHT
ISSUES WITH FAA DELEGATION AND A POTENTIAL
REMEDY IN THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
DREW H. NUNN*
ABSTRACT
The over-delegation by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) of new aircraft design certification authority to the very
companies seeking such certification has led to a stunning lack
of oversight and bending to private economic interests. Con-
gressional action must be taken to ensure that aircraft certifica-
tion authority, if delegated to private entities, is not delegated to
any entities with ties to the companies seeking certification, and
FAA oversight must be tightened.
This Comment analyzes whether the Federal Tort Claims Act
could provide a potential avenue for plaintiffs to challenge the
FAA as it relates to its oversight and delegation to The Boeing
Company (Boeing). In the face of inaction from the FAA, Boe-
ing, and Congress, the judiciary provides the best hope for hold-
ing the FAA accountable when it delegates authority to private
industry leaders like Boeing. It is likely well within the FAA’s
discretion to determine that the engineers at Boeing to whom
Boeing would assign to this task are qualified in their engineer-
ing capabilities. However, if the FAA knew that economic pres-
sures and factors outside of plane safety were guiding Boeing
executives’ directions to its inspecting engineers, it may have
delegated its certification authority to unqualified individuals,
which it cannot do.
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2021; B.S. Biochemistry,
Texas A&M University. I would like to thank my parents for their encouragement
and my wife, Miranda, for her constant love and support. Also, a special thanks to
my first-year legal writing professor, Heather Stobaugh, for teaching me how to
be a competent writer.
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S over-delegation of new aircraftdesign certification authority to the very companies seeking
such certification has led to a stunning lack of oversight and
bending to private economic interests. Congressional action
must be taken to ensure that aircraft certification authority, if
delegated to private entities, is not delegated to any entities with
ties to the companies seeking certification, and Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) oversight must be tightened.
This Comment begins by describing the background of the
Boeing 737 (737) aircraft and the recent 737 MAX accidents.
The serious consequences of those crashes are explored, and
the scope of the problem is put into perspective. The Comment
then explains the relevant historical background of the FAA and
the designation program, establishes the framework within
which recent issues faced by The Boeing Company (Boeing) re-
side, and discusses how the delegation program came to be and
how the FAA designates private parties as Organization Designa-
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tion Authority (ODA) holders (ODA Holders). Next, it analyzes
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and how the Supreme
Court has interpreted the discretionary function exception to
the FTCA.
This Comment then assesses whether the FTCA could provide
a potential avenue for plaintiffs to challenge the FAA’s over-del-
egation of certification authority to Boeing. While this route was
not historically open to plaintiffs, by delegating certain aspects
of the safety inspection process to Boeing and failing to main-
tain oversight, the FAA’s actions have moved outside the protec-
tion of the discretionary function exception, allowing suits
against the FAA by injured plaintiffs. This Comment concludes
by discussing why litigation is the best way to spur meaningful
reform.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. THE 737 MAX AND COMPETITION WITH AIRBUS
The Boeing 737 is one of the most widely recognizable passen-
ger aircraft in the world. Since its first flight in 1967, the 737 has
undergone a series of enhancements, culminating most recently
with the 737 Next Generation (737NG) and the 737 MAX.1
These upgrades were designed to provide more fuel-efficient en-
gines, updated avionics and cabins, and lower operating costs,
all while having enough in common with previous models that
pilots could easily switch back and forth between them.2 In
2006, Boeing began discussions to significantly upgrade or re-
place the 737NG with a new, more fuel efficient model.3 By
2010, Boeing still had not made a decision when one of its chief
rivals in the industry, Airbus SE (Airbus), announced the
A320neo, “a re-engined, more efficient version of its A320, the
main competitor to the 737.”4 These two industry titans have
been in competition for almost half a century, and many have
wondered whether the tradeoffs being made in the interest of
1 David Slotnick, The First Boeing 737 Max Crash was 2 Years Ago Today. Here’s the
Complete History of the Plane That’s Been Grounded Since 2 Crashes Killed 346 People 5





4 Id. Neo stands for new engine option.
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competition were dangerous.5 In 2011, Boeing’s then-CEO
feared that American Airlines, one of Boeing’s exclusive custom-
ers, would switch to Airbus unless Boeing could convince them
otherwise.6 Boeing decided to upgrade the engines on the 737
and build a new plane, launching Boeing’s effort to circumvent
important regulatory hurdles.7 American Airlines wound up
purchasing from Airbus, but also ordered 100 next generation
737s from Boeing, and “[j]ust one month later, Boeing an-
nounced the 737 MAX family,” the newest iteration of the 737.8
A key selling point of the 737 MAX was its purported similarity
with older models, which would make it easier for pilots and
staff to adjust to without much additional training.9 Signifi-
cantly, and likely most important to Boeing executives, this pro-
vided a faster route to certification than what would be
necessary for a brand new type of aircraft.10 One of the key dif-
ferences in the new plane was that the engines were larger, fur-
ther forward, and higher up than the previous version.11 This
upgrade could cause the nose of the plane to pitch slightly up-
ward in some situations, leading engineers to implement auto-
mated software called Maneuvering Control Augmentation
System (MCAS), which would automatically push the nose down
so that the plane stays level.12 Though theoretically the pilots
could fly both the old and new planes, “Boeing did not include
training on MCAS in the pilots’ manual, reasoning that the
software would work in the background.”13 “MCAS was designed
to take effect when a single sensor showed that the ‘angle-of at-
tack’ was high,” meaning the system would still respond if one of
the two sensors broke.14 Issues surrounding this system would
5 Peter Cohan, Did Airbus Rivalry Drive Dangerous Tradeoffs for Boeing’s 737
MAX?, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2019, 9:14 AM), https://forbes.com/sites/petercohan/
2019/03/28/did-airbus-rivalry-drive-dangerous-tradeoffs-for-boeings-737-max/
[perma.cc/BU8H-9JSV].
6 Slotnick, supra note 1.
7 Cohan, supra note 5; David Gelles, Natalie Kitroeff, Jack Nicas & Rebecca R.
Ruiz, Boeing Was ‘Go, Go, Go’ to Beat Airbus With The 737 Max, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23,
2019), https://nytimes.com/2019/03/23/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html
[perma.cc/N25Z-EHAJ].




12 Cohan, supra note 5; Slotnick, supra note 1.
13 Slotnick, supra note 1.
14 Id.
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later prove catastrophic.15 In 2015, the first 737 MAX was re-
leased, with its first test flight in 2016.16 It gained certification
from the FAA in 2017.17 “By May 2018 . . . more than 130 [737
MAX] planes were in service with 28 different airlines around
the world.”18
B. THE LION AIR AND ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES CRASHES
On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610 took off from
Jakarta, Indonesia in the early hours of the morning.19 The
plane had given incorrect speed and altitude readings during a
previous flight but was kept in service.20 Immediately after take-
off, the pilots received stall warnings; their instruments were not
giving readings on key data, and it seemed the plane was auto-
matically being forced into a downward pitch.21 Twelve minutes
later, the plane crashed into the sea, killing all 189 on board.22
Shortly after the investigation began, MCAS and the pilots’ re-
sponse became a focus, and the FAA and Boeing said they
planned to issue an Airworthiness Directive on issues related to
the system.23
Less than five months later, a disturbingly similar scene
played out in Ethiopia, when an Ethiopian Airlines flight
crashed, killing everyone on board.24 Once again, pilots of a 737
MAX were unable to control the pitch of the aircraft, and MCAS
forced the nose down and crashed the plane.25 Shortly after the
crash, although it was clear MCAS played a role, investigators
were unsure how much fault lay with the pilots.26 However, a
year later, investigators determined that MCAS was entirely at
15 See infra Section II.B.








24 Tucker Reals, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Crash; Preliminary Report Says Pilots
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fault, shining an even more negative light on the aircraft itself
and on Boeing.27
Ethiopian Airlines grounded the rest of its 737 MAX fleet the
day of the crash.28 The rest of the world followed suit, and soon
the highly publicized global grounding of the plane was in full
force.29 However, the FAA was the last to do so.30 Boeing initially
thought it could get the software issue fixed and the planes back
up and running by the end of March 2019.31 But due to delays
with the software updates, the FAA only cleared the 737 MAX
aircraft to fly again in late 2020.32
C. FALLOUT
The fallout from the crashes continues to grow, touching all
aspects of government (particularly the FAA), the airline indus-
try, and Boeing. The FAA continued to scrutinize the plane fol-
lowing delays in a potential fix, which led to the entire
certification process coming under scrutiny.33 Boeing has had to
cut production of the 737 MAX, suffering significant losses.34
“[It] is in talks with banks to secure a loan of $10 billion or more
. . . as the company faces rising costs stemming from two fatal
crashes of its 737 MAX planes.”35 Recently, Boeing announced
that further delays are expected after the recent disclosure of a
software issue.36 These delays will continue to drive up costs as
customers seek compensation for undelivered planes.37 Airbus
has now surpassed Boeing as the world’s largest aircraft manu-
27 Simon Marks & Abdi Latif Dahir, Ethiopian Report on 737 Max Crash Blames
Boeing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2020), https://nytimes.com/2020/03/09/world/af-
rica/ethiopia-crash-boeing.html [perma.cc/Z4GM-PSUR].
28 Slotnick, supra note 1.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Slotnick, supra note 1; American Airlines Plans to Return Boeing 737 Max to
Service at Year-End, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2020), https://reuters.com/article/us-boe-
ing-737max-american-airline/american-air-to-run-boeing-737-max-at-year-end-
bloomberg-news-idUSKBN27305O [perma.cc/A2KT-BLYR].
32 Niraj Chokshi, Boeing 737 Max Is Cleared by F.A.A. to Fly Again, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/18/business/boeing-737-
max-faa.html [perma.cc/WZR5-KJSC].
33 Slotnick, supra note 1.
34 Leslie Josephs, Boeing Is in Talks to Borrow $10 Billion or More as 737 Max Crisis
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facturer, and Boeing’s credit rating has been placed under
review.38
Congress has gotten involved and launched investigations
into Boeing, the FAA, and the relationship between the two.
Dennis Muilenburg, former Boeing CEO, testified before Con-
gress in October 2019 and was subject to intense questioning.39
In December 2019, Boeing fired Muilenburg for his handling of
the 737 MAX crises.40 During the congressional investigation,
FAA administrator Steve Dickson gave a shocking piece of testi-
mony: “After the first crash, an internal FAA analysis showed a
high likelihood of future crashes, as many as 15 over the 30–40
year life of the jet. However, the FAA let the plane keep
flying.”41
The FAA commissioned the Joint Authorities Technical Re-
view (JATR), consisting of technical experts from the FAA, Na-
tional Aeronautics & Space Administration, European Union
Aviation Safety Agency, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Indo-
nesia, Japan, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates.42 The
review documented observations, findings, and a series of rec-
ommendations for actions that could be taken to help prevent
similar tragedies from occurring.43
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FAA
In 1926, at the urging of aviation industry leaders, and in an
effort to help air travel reach its full commercial potential, the
Air Commerce Act was passed.44 Under this initial version of
what would later become the Federal Aviation Act, the Secretary
of Commerce was charged with “fostering air commerce, issuing
and enforcing air traffic rules, licensing pilots, certifying air-
craft, establishing airways, and operating and maintaining aids
38 Id.
39 Slotnick, supra note 1.
40 Josephs, supra note 34.
41 Slotnick, supra note 1.
42 The Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) – Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control




44 A Brief History of the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2017, 4:42 PM),
https://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/ [perma.cc/ZN5M-N7BR]; Air
Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
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to air navigation.”45 One of the first tasks of the new Bureau of
Air Commerce centered on air traffic control.46 But by the early
1930s, the Department of Commerce’s oversight responsibilities
were already being called into question following crashes that
killed a prominent football coach and a U.S. Senator.47 To en-
sure a focus on safety, President Franklin Roosevelt signed the
Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938, establishing the Civil Aeronautics
Authority (CAA) to conduct investigations into aviation acci-
dents and provide recommendations to prevent future acci-
dents.48 Just before the United States’ entry into World War II,
the CAA took full control over air traffic control towers, making
air traffic control a permanent federal responsibility.49 However,
in 1956, a midair collision killed 128 people and highlighted the
need for even greater oversight and safety control of national
airspace.50
In 1958, the Federal Aviation Act was passed, transferring the
CAA function to the new independent Federal Aviation
Agency.51 Feeling a need for a coordinated transportation sys-
tem among all modes of transportation, Congress authorized
the creation of the Department of Transportation in 1966 and
1967.52 The Federal Aviation Agency became known as the FAA,
and oversight of the FAA soon transitioned to the Department
of Transportation.53 However, the new agency was not just
tasked with safety, but also with fostering air commerce.54 As one
commenter has noted, “This additional imperative has had a
profound impact on the development of the FAA and its admin-
istrative functions over the past four decades.”55 Thus, from the
beginning, the FAA has had to balance airline safety against
commercial success in the airline industry—two positions that
will inevitably conflict from time to time.56 Concerns over this
45 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 44.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 1131.
49 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 44.
50 Id.
51 Id.; Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
52 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 44.
53 Id.
54 Federal Aviation Act, pmbl.
55 Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (And Airplanes): The Federal Aviation
Administration, “Agency Capture,” and Airline Security, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 381, 407 (2002).
56 Id.
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“dual mandate” led to statutory amendments removing the “pro-
moting” language and focusing more on safety.57 Nonetheless,
“[o]ne salient apparent consequence of the FAA’s dual mandate
has been its extensive reliance on the private entities it
regulates.”58
B. THE ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION AUTHORITY: DELEGATION
OF CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY TO PRIVATE ENTITIES
Part of the legislation directing the Secretary of Transporta-
tion to promote safety in the airline industry granted the Secre-
tary the discretion to “prescribe reasonable rules and
regulations” governing aircraft inspection, including how the in-
spections would be accomplished.59 Congress, however, empha-
sized that air carriers themselves “retained certain
responsibilities to promote the public interest in air safety.”60
Congress established a certification process to monitor and con-
trol how the airline industry complied with the regulations.61 At
each step in this process, FAA employees inspect materials sub-
mitted by aircraft manufacturers for compliance, then issue the
appropriate certificate to allow the manufacturers to produce
and market their products.62
Step one in this process is known as type certification.63 This
involves obtaining FAA approval of the plane’s basic design.64
“By regulation, the FAA has made the applicant itself responsi-
ble for conducting all inspections and tests necessary to deter-
mine that the aircraft comports with FAA airworthiness
requirements.”65 During this process, a prototype of the new
57 Id. at 408.
58 Id. at 413.
59 United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Air-
lines), 467 U.S. 797, 804 (1984).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 805.
63 Id.; 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.11–.55 (2020).
64 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 805.
65 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.33, 21.35).
Each applicant must make all inspections and tests necessary to
determine
(1) Compliance with the applicable airworthiness, aircraft noise,
fuel venting, and exhaust emission requirements;
(2) That materials and products conform to the specifications in
the type design;
(3) That parts of the products conform to the drawings in the
type design; and
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plane is developed, and ground and flight tests are conducted.66
The FAA then reviews all the submitted data and, if it finds the
proposed design meets the minimum safety standards, it ap-
proves the design and issues a type certificate.67 However, pro-
duction still cannot begin.68 Before production, a company must
obtain a production certificate allowing it to produce copies of
the prototype for commercial use.69 “To obtain a production
certificate, the manufacturer must prove to the FAA that it has
established and can maintain a quality control system to assure
that each aircraft will meet the design provision of the type cer-
tificate.”70 While this certificate allows the manufacturer to mass
produce the new aircraft, it still cannot be put into service.71
First, the FAA must grant an airworthiness certificate, essentially
assuring the particular plane is safe for flying.72
When an aircraft manufacturer like Boeing wants to upgrade
its planes and introduce a major change in its design, yet an-
other certificate is required: a supplemental type certificate.73
If a person holds the [type certificate] for a product and alters
that product by introducing a major change in type design that
does not require an application for a new [type certificate] under
§ 21.19, that person must apply to the FAA either for an STC, or
to amend the original type certificate under subpart D of this
part.74
To obtain this supplemental type certificate, the altered aircraft
must meet its airworthiness requirements.75 Similar to the prior
steps, the applicant must conduct the required inspections and
tests to ensure its product complies with regulations.76 However,
this is no small task. The FAA has a limited number of engineers
(4) That the manufacturing processes, construction and assem-
bly conform to those specified in the type design.
14 C.F.R. § 21.33(b).
66 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 805–06.
67 Id. at 806.
68 Id.
69 Id.; 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.131–.150.
70 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 806.
71 Id.
72 Id.; 14 C.F.R. § 21.183.
73 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 806 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 21.113).
74 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 21.113).
75 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 21.115(a)).
76 Id.
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and employees.77 “[R]oughly 700 individuals are responsible for
ALL design approvals, production & continued airworthiness of
everything that flies and of that, maybe 400 are engineers.”78 In
contrast, private companies like Boeing employ thousands of
employees. “According to the Boeing website, it has over 45,000
engineers spread throughout the entire company. [With s]uch a
deep roster of talent, [Boeing] has incredibly deep and specific
expertise for new designs and to manage the safety and airwor-
thiness of the nearly 14,000 Boeing airplanes flying today.”79
In response to the FAA’s limited resources, Congress has au-
thorized the FAA to delegate some of its testing authority.80 The
FAA “may delegate to a qualified private person, or to an em-
ployee under the supervision of that person, a matter related to
(A) the examination, testing, and inspection necessary to issue a
certificate under this chapter; and (B) issuing the certificate.”81
Based on this provision, the FAA created the ODA program to
delegate to private organizations its authority to inspect aircraft
designs and issue certificates.82 “An FAA Designation ‘allows an
organization to perform specified functions on behalf of the Ad-
ministrator related to engineering, manufacturing, operations,
airworthiness, or maintenance.’”83 This ODA system is designed
to be a system of direct oversight.
Generally, to be considered as an ODA, an applicant must:
(1) Have sufficient facilities, resources, and personnel, to per-
form the functions for which authorization is requested;
(2) Have sufficient experience with FAA requirements,
processes, and procedures to perform the functions for
which authorization is requested; and
(3) Have sufficient, relevant experience to perform the func-
tions for which authorization is requested.84
According to federal regulations:
The ODA Holder must—
77 Mike Borfitz, What FAA Delegation Does—How and Why?, AVIATION TECH.





81 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d)(1).
82 Riggs v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc., 939 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2019).
83 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 183.41(a) (2020)).
84 14 C.F.R. § 183.47.
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(a) Comply with the procedures contained in its approved
procedures manual;
(b) Give ODA Unit members sufficient authority to perform
the authorized functions;
(c) Ensure that no conflicting non-ODA Unit duties or other
interreference affects the performance of authorized func-
tions by ODA Unit members;
(d) Cooperate with the [FAA] Administrator in his perform-
ance of oversight of the ODA Holder and the ODA Unit;
(e) Notify the [FAA] Administrator of any change that could
affect the ODA Holder’s ability to continue to meet the
requirements of this part within 48 hours of the change
occurring.85
Though its origins date back to the 1950s, the ODA program
itself began in 2005 and was not fully implemented until 2009.86
This system relies heavily on the integrity and transparency of
the ODA holder and strict, careful oversight by the FAA.
C. THE FTCA AND THE FAA
In 1946, Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) as part of the Legislative Reorganization Act.87 The
FTCA authorizes suits against the United States for damages:
[F]or injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em-
ployee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in ac-
cordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.88
However, there are exceptions; the FTCA does not waive federal
sovereign immunity in all respects.89 In particular, under the dis-
cretionary function exemption,90 the FTCA does not apply to
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such state or regulation be valid, or
85 Id. § 183.57.
86 Roncevert Ganan Almond, After the Max: Rebuilding U.S. Aviation Leadership,
60 VA. J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 14 (2019).
87 David S. Fishback & Gail Killefer, The Discretionary Function Exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 291, 293
(1989).
88 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
89 Fishback & Killefer, supra note 87, at 293.
90 Id. at 294.
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based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exer-
cise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused.91
The scope of the discretionary function exemption has been an
area of dispute since the passage of the FTCA.92 “On the one
hand, some saw the exception as standing for the simple pro-
position that the FTCA could not be used to review high-level
policy decisions. On the other hand, some saw the exception as
severely limiting what otherwise would have been a very broad
waiver of sovereign immunity.”93
The seminal case regarding interpretation of the exception
and the scope of the waiver is Dalehite v. United States.94 In that
negligence case, explosions destroyed much of Texas City,
Texas and killed hundreds of people.95 The cause of the explo-
sions was fertilizer the government made and shipped to Europe
as post-war aid.96 The easily-ignitable fertilizer was packaged in
flammable paper containers with no hazard warning, leading to
large explosions during loading onto ships.97 The plaintiffs al-
leged negligence by the large body of officials and employees
involved in the program.98 Though the Supreme Court did not
determine where the line for discretion ends, it held that the
actions of the federal government—the decision to start the pro-
gram and the actions taken in aid of the program—were not
actionable as they involved some measure of discretion.99 The
Court noted that “[w]here there is room for policy judgment
and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of
subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in
accordance with official directions cannot be actionable.”100
Critics of the decision noted its language was incredibly broad
and could potentially encompass almost everything “except the
most routine postal truck injury-type cases.”101
91 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953)).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 294–95.
98 Id. at 295.
99 Id.
100 Id. (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35–36 (1953)).
101 Id. at 296.
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In United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines), a 1984 case addressing FAA delegation, the Su-
preme Court attempted to clarify its position and understanding
of the discretionary function exemption.102 The Varig Court
held that the discretionary function exemption barred the plain-
tiff’s FTCA suit challenging the FAA’s decision to delegate re-
sponsibility for compliance with FAA safety regulations to the
aircraft manufacturer and its means of monitoring compli-
ance.103 “The Varig Court explained that Congress included the
discretionary function exception ‘to prevent judicial second-
guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in
social, economic, and political policy through the medium of a
tort suit.’”104 The Court stressed that the exception not only pro-
tects discretionary acts of the government in its conduct regulat-
ing role but also protects its policy judgments.105 Later Supreme
Court decisions defined the outer limits of the discretionary
function exemption,106 stating that the exemption effectively
does not apply when a statute, regulation, or policy specifically
prescribes a course of action for a government employee to fol-
low.107 It is within this legal framework that this Comment con-
siders the FTCA as a potential remedy for plaintiffs wronged by
negligent government acts related to the Boeing 737 MAX
crashes.
IV. ANALYSIS
The legal issues facing Boeing and the FAA are extensive and
are not fully explored in this Comment.108 These include law-
suits against Boeing by the families of the victims, claims for
compensation from airlines that have unfulfilled orders for the
737 MAX, and lawsuits by Boeing shareholders alleging fiduci-
ary breaches.109 While these suits address ancillary problems,
102 Id. (citing United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984)).
103 Id. at 298.
104 Id. (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813–14).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 301.
107 Id. at 302 (citing Berkowitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)).
108 See Arthur I. Willner, Raymond L. Mariani & Emily K. Doty, Recent Develop-
ments in Aviation Law – 2019, 85 J. AIR L. & COM. 221, 250–58 (2020).
109 Sinéad Baker, Here Are All the Investigations and Lawsuits that Boeing and the
FAA are Facing After the 737 Max Crashes Killed Almost 350 People, BUS. INSIDER (June
24, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-737-max-crisis-list-lawsuits-in-
vestigations-faces-faa-2019-5 [https://perma.cc/KM4E-VS7E]; Tom Hals & Tracy
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they do not get to the heart of the issue—there are serious flaws
in the aircraft certification process that allowed the 737 MAX to
fly. These structural failures fall into a few specific categories,
each of which can be addressed through legislation or through
FTCA claims against the FAA. The JATR report took issue with
the FAA’s failures to: (1) designate flight-path-altering changes
as “significant” changes, which would have subjected the certifi-
cation to stricter standards;110 (2) conduct whole aircraft inspec-
tion, determining how MCAS would interplay with other
systems;111 (3) delegate inspection duty to individuals or entities
with MCAS expertise;112 (4) immediately ground the 737
MAX;113 and (5) take steps to ensure the impartiality of dele-
gated safety inspectors with compromising ties to Boeing.114 Two
primary issues include: (1) the meaning of “qualified private”
individuals under the statute authorizing the FAA to delegate its
safety inspection authority; and (2) whether the director of the
FAA has full discretion to determine who constitutes a qualified
private individual.
A. THE FTCA AS AN AVENUE TO FAA ACCOUNTABILITY
Federal agencies such as the FAA are largely shielded from
lawsuits for negligence and other claims under the discretionary
function exemption of the FTCA.115 Under the exemption,
claims cannot be brought against government employees who,
while executing a duty prescribed by statute or regulation, per-
form a “discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or any employee of the government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused.”116 Since Congress did not define
a “discretionary function,” the scope of this exemption has
Rucinski, Lawsuit Against Boeing Seeks to Hold Board Liable for 737 MAX Problems,
REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2019, 3:32 PM), https://reuters.com/article/us-boeing-
737max-lawsuit-board/lawsuit-against-boeing-seeks-to-hold-board-liable-for-737-
max-problems-idUSKBN1XS2I3 [perma.cc/M9T3-QB2Q]; Boeing Settles First Law-
suit With 737 Max Crash Families, DW (Sept. 25, 2019), https://dw.com/en/boe-
ing-settles-first-lawsuit-with-737-max-crash-families/a-50587098 [perma.cc/5P4Q-
YZNJ].
110 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., BOEING 737 MAX FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM OBSER-
VATIONS, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS, at I (2019).
111 Id. at 6.
112 Id. at 26.
113 Id. at 49.
114 Id. at 30.
115 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
116 Id.
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largely been borne out by judicial decisions. Courts use a gener-
alized two-part test to determine if the exemption applies.117
First, the Court determines whether the action is discretionary,
involving “an element of judgment or choice” in the absence of
a law or policy that prescribes a course of action.”118 Second, if
the conduct is discretionary, the judgment must be “the kind
that the discretionary function exception was designed to
shield”—those actions based on policy analysis.119
In the case of the 737 MAX certification process, there are
three areas where fault may be found and where the discretion-
ary function exemption may apply: (1) the FAA’s delegation of
portions of the certification process to Boeing via the FAA’s
ODA program;120 (2) FAA oversight of the process by the FAA’s
Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office (BASOO);121 and (3)
the issuance of the amended type certificate for the 737 MAX
with MCAS installed.122
1. Delegation of the Certification Process to Boeing
While it is undisputed that the FAA is allowed to delegate cer-
tification authority to private parties and that the ODA program
as a whole is a discretionary function,123 it is worth questioning
whether delegating the MCAS certification process falls under
the FTCA exemption. In 1984, the Supreme Court faced a simi-
lar situation in the Varig Airlines case. Following an accident that
killed 124 people involving a Boeing 707 aircraft, plaintiffs tried
to file suit against the FAA alleging negligence in “failing to in-
spect certain elements of aircraft design” before issuing certifica-
tion. Plaintiffs took specific issue with the “spot-check” FAA
review method and the application of that method to the air-
craft involved in the case.124
The Supreme Court held the discretionary function exemp-
tion shielded the FAA because its decisions about how to con-
duct its compliance review are discretionary actions “of the most
117 Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at 26.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 9.
123 United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Air-
lines), 467 U.S. 797, 807 (1984).
124 Id. at 819.
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basic kind.”125 The FAA was within its statutory rights to consider
the resources it has available, decide how to delegate its certifi-
cation authority, and determine how it would oversee the desig-
nee’s inspection process.126 The statute authorizes the FAA to
delegate to a qualified private person a matter related to issuing
certificates or examination and testing necessary to issue a certif-
icate.127 Because the statute does not describe a specific course
of action to be taken by the FAA or designee in the certification
process, the Court ruled that such a decision was within the dis-
cretion of the FAA and the designee.128 While the Court was
correct that the statute’s language is broad and general, Con-
gress set forth a qualification which constrains the delegation:
the designee must be a qualified private individual.129 It is not
within the discretion of the FAA to designate an unqualified in-
dividual to conduct inspections or certify the aircraft. Here,
there are serious concerns about the qualifications of those per-
sons inspecting and certifying MCAS.130
Among other concerns, FAA engineers and Boeing employees
raised red flags about the lack of qualified engineers available to
review changes to the aircraft, including MCAS.131 In 2005, Con-
gress (in response to industry lobbying efforts) allowed Boeing
to choose the engineers who would assist with the FAA’s review
and certification process.132 Some FAA engineers have com-
mented that, over time, this change has led to an inability to
monitor what was happening at Boeing.133 During the 737
MAX’s development, two of the BASOO’s most prominent and
experienced engineers—who were responsible for flight control
systems including MCAS—resigned and were replaced by an en-
gineer with “little experience in flight controls” and a new hire
fresh out of school.134 “People who worked with the two [new]
engineers said they seemed ill-equipped to identify any
125 Id. at 819–20.
126 Id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d).
127 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 807; 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d).
128 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 805.
129 See supra Section III.B.
130 Natalie Kitroeff, David Gelles & Jack Nicas, The Roots of Boeing’s 737 Max
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problems in a complex system like MCAS.”135 Furthermore,
while the FAA originally retained certification authority over
MCAS’s addition, it later delegated that authority to Boeing.136
With so much authority being delegated to Boeing, it is im-
portant to determine whether those involved in the Boeing
ODA are qualified private people within the meaning of the stat-
ute. Federal regulations outlining the qualifications and duties
of ODAs are a good starting point to examine who counts as a
qualified private individual.137 To qualify, an applicant must
generally have sufficient facilities, resources, and experience to
conduct the duties that have been delegated to them—in this
case, certifying the changes made to the aircraft, including
MCAS.138 It is likely well within the FAA’s discretion to deter-
mine if the engineers that Boeing would assign to this task are
qualified in their engineering capabilities. However, it is the re-
sponsibility of the ODA Holder (Boeing) to “[e]nsure that no
conflicting non-ODA duties or other interference affects the
performance of authorized functions by ODA Unit mem-
bers.”139 Accordingly, Boeing has a duty to ensure no undue
pressure or influence, such as a race to produce a plane before a
competitor, affects the diligence of engineers tasked with certify-
ing the safety of the new systems. It stands to reason that Boe-
ing’s inability to ensure it meets this responsibility could render
it unqualified to hold an ODA designation. Therefore, if the
FAA knew economic pressures and factors other than plane
safety guided Boeing’s directions to its inspecting engineers,
then the FAA delegated its certification authority to an unquali-
fied individual, which it cannot do.140
There is evidence that, throughout the 737 MAX certification
process, Boeing placed profit-motivated pressures on its employ-
ees and the FAA. According to the JATR’s findings, “signs were
reported of undue pressures on Boeing ODA engineering unit
members . . . performing certification activities on the B737
MAX program, which further erodes the level of assurance in
this system of delegation.”141 According to a former Boeing engi-
neer, the company “puts its 737 MAX engineers under immense
135 Id.
136 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at 26.
137 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 183.47, 183.57 (2020).
138 Id. § 183.47(a).
139 Id. § 183.57(c).
140 See 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d).
141 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at VII.
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pressure to lower production costs and to downplay new fea-
tures to avoid scrutiny” by the FAA.142 The engineer said he saw
“a lack of sufficient resources to do the job in its entirety.”143
Given how intertwined Boeing’s officials are with the FAA, it is
possible that the FAA was at least aware of the possibility of un-
due pressure or influence being asserted on the engineers re-
sponsible for the certification.144 Given the evidence of undue
pressure and influence, the perceived inability of the Boeing en-
gineers’ ability to complete their safety certification directives,
and the qualification requirements of ODA Holders, there is a
colorable argument that the FAA’s designation to Boeing of cer-
tification authority over MCAS was to an unqualified private in-
dividual, which is forbidden by the statute.145 This could
potentially bar the application of the discretionary function ex-
emption and allow families of those killed in the crashes to
bring FTCA suits against the FAA.
If the first prong of the Berkovitz test is not met because au-
thority was delegated to private individuals who were not quali-
fied, there is no need to move on to the second prong—the
discretionary function exemption does not apply. However,
even if the second prong does not need to be satisfied, analysis
can still demonstrate the principle that courts strive not to sec-
ond guess agency policy decisions.146 A growing body of evi-
dence suggests the delegation in this case was not made on
policy grounds, but was instead intended to tilt the scales in Boe-
ing’s race against Airbus.147 Permitted policy considerations ar-
guably do not include the economic interests of a single
airplane manufacturer.
142 Alexandra Ma, A Former Boeing 737 Max Engineer Said He Was ‘Incredibly Pres-
surized’ to Keep Costs Down and Downplay New Features to Avoid FAA Scrutiny, BUS.
INSIDER (July 29, 2019, 5:24 AM), https://businessinsider.com/boeing-737-max-
former-engineer-pressure-costs-avoid-faa-scrutiny-2019-7 [perma.cc/8JLN-HF5A].
143 Id.
144 See Kitroeff et al., supra note 130.
145 See supra Section III.B.
146 Fishback & Killefer, supra note 87, at 302 (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
147 Thomas Kaplan, After Boeing Crashes, Sharp Questions About Industry Regulat-
ing Itself, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2019). https://nytimes.com/2019/03/26/us/polit-
ics/boeing-faa.html [perma.cc/YM2X-7W89].
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2. Improper FAA Oversight and Issuing the Certificate—A Dead
End
The most glaring and well-publicized criticism of the 737
MAX crisis is that there is a significant lack of meaningful FAA
oversight over the Boeing ODA program and the 737 MAX certi-
fication process.148 Throughout the 737 MAX certification pro-
cess, the FAA continually delegated more of its oversight
responsibility to Boeing.149 Members of the BASOO program in
charge of oversight complained they were underqualified and
unable to understand the significance of MCAS.150 “For exam-
ple, during an initial project review, an FAA engineer failed to
detect that a manufacturer’s certification plan did not demon-
strate compliance with specific aviation regulations governing
design and construction of aircraft flight controls.”151 However,
the FAA’s ODA oversight duties are even more generalized and
vague, requiring little more than merely overseeing the ODA in
unspecified terms.152 The FAA engineers had no explicit duty to
review MCAS themselves.153 It is likely within the discretionary
function exemption for the FAA to determine what oversight is
appropriate and who to place on any oversight committee re-
garding a specific certification, as the Varig Airlines case states.154
Beyond the Varig decision, other circuit courts have rein-
forced the point that oversight-based allegations of negligence
on the part of the FAA are barred by the discretionary function
exemption.155 In Alinsky v. United States, victims of an aircraft col-
lision tried to sue the FAA under the FTCA, alleging, among
other things, that the agency was negligent in contracting out
and overseeing the training and appointing of aircraft control-
lers.156 Explaining that the discretionary function exemption
shielded the FAA, the Seventh Circuit stated:
Here, Congress authorized the FAA to enter into contracts, as
necessary, to carry out the functions of the FAA, and thus the
148 See, e.g., Almond, supra note 86, at 15.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 16.
151 Id. at 15.
152 See 49 U.S.C. § 44736(a)(1).
153 Id.
154 United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Air-
lines), 467 U.S. 797, 819–20 (1984).
155 Alinsky v. United States, 415 F.3d 639, 648 (7th Cir. 2005); Riggs v. Airbus
Helicopters, Inc., 939 F.3d 981, 992 n.2 (9th Cir. 2019).
156 Alinsky, 415 F.3d at 647.
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government did not violate a specific mandatory statute, regula-
tion or policy in hiring Midwest to provide training and oversight
at Meigs. The plaintiffs also fail to identify any mandatory statute
or regulation dictating how the FAA must oversee private con-
tractors or assure the contractor complies with federal regula-
tions and the contract provisions. Where the plaintiffs’ claim is
premised on negligent oversight, such a showing is imperative.157
Since the FAA made the discretionary decision to contract out
the selection, training, and oversight of air traffic controllers in
the case, the FAA was not open to attack for oversight failures.158
The Alinksy decision is distinguishable from the case of the
737 MAX and may provide a means of attacking the FAA for its
failed oversight. Alinksy focused on the FAA’s decision to dele-
gate to a third party authority to select and train air traffic con-
trollers.159 But here, the FAA retained certain oversight
authority, which it vested in the BASOO.160
According to the JATR report, “[t]he BASOO is required to
perform a certification function, including making findings of
compliance of retained (non-delegated) requirements, while
also performing the oversight function of the Boeing ODA. The
BASOO must have the resources to carry out these two primary
functions without compromise.”161 Therefore, the FAA may not
have provided enough adequate, qualified individuals to admin-
ister its retained oversight over the 737 MAX certification. Some
of the engineers involved in the small oversight team were re-
cent graduates and people unfamiliar with MCAS.162
The JATR report found that there were twenty-four engineers
on the BASOO team, and that the allocated staffing levels may
not have been sufficient to “carry out the work associated with
retained items and with the conduct of oversight duties.”163 This
critical understaffing could have played a part in some key over-
sights, including the failure to list the appropriate MCAS correc-
tion. Initially, Boeing determined and submitted to the FAA that
MCAS limited automated corrections in the airplane’s flight up
to 0.6 degrees.164 However, the final system design was submit-
157 Id.
158 Id. at 648.
159 Id.
160 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at VII.
161 Id.
162 See Kitroeff et al., supra note 130.
163 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at VII.
164 Dominic Gates, Flawed Analysis, Failed Oversight: How Boeing, FAA Certified the
Suspect 737 MAX Flight Control System, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 17, 2019), https://
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ted and reviewed with a 2.5-degree limitation instead of 0.6.165
Boeing decided such a change was insignificant, and so it was
never reviewed by FAA oversight engineers, who were unaware
of the change until after the crashes.166 Among other factors,
this was one of the key causes of the system failure.
Even if Boeing had disclosed this change to the FAA, it is un-
likely the change would have been noticed or further examined
due to inadequate staffing at the FAA.167 Moreover, while the
FAA has discretion to decide how to conduct oversight over its
retained functions, that discretion is still bound by statutory lim-
its.168 Thus, if the FAA had a legal duty to provide adequate and
qualified supervision of certain aspects of the certification, and
the team dedicated to doing so did not have the staff to accom-
plish it, it could be argued the FAA acted outside of its discre-
tion in allocating its employees. At the same time, however, the
FAA’s decisions of how to allocate limited resources are exactly
the sort of circumstance that typically invites judicial
deference.169
Other circuit court decisions relating to the policy prong of
the FTCA’s discretionary function exemption indicate that, ab-
sent clear, specific statutory mandates, the FAA is likely within its
rights to consider a wide variety of policy decisions.170 For exam-
ple, the Second Circuit has held that the government’s use of a
chemical agent was discretionary, as were its contracting deci-
sions in performing field tests with that agent.171 Similarly, the
First and Ninth Circuits have held that, once a private contrac-
tor is delegated authority to perform some function, the govern-
ment is not liable for the contractor’s failure to protect its
employees from dangers typically within the government’s pur-
view.172 But that discretion is not without limits. A footnote in
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scope.173 The Court noted that: “While the initial decision to
undertake and maintain lighthouse service was a discretionary
judgment . . . failure to maintain the lighthouse in good condi-
tion subjected the Government to suit under the FTCA [be-
cause] the latter course of conduct did not involve any
permissible exercise of policy judgment.”174
Here, it was within the FAA’s discretion to delegate some cer-
tification responsibility to Boeing and to retain some for itself.175
But once it has decided to retain certain oversight duties, it can
only exercise policy judgments that are permissible.176 Economic
considerations, FAA resources, and public safety are all valid,
permissible policy considerations that should not be subject to
judicial scrutiny.177 However, it is questionable whether the
FAA’s consideration of Boeing’s desire to meet deadlines and
compete with Airbus is a permissible consideration, and there is
evidence that those interests were considered when the FAA was
deciding who would conduct the oversight.178 “A former FAA
safety engineer who was directly involved in certifying the MAX
[8] said that halfway through the certification process, ‘we were
asked by management to re-evaluate what would be delegated.
Management thought we had retained too much at the
FAA.’”179 In a troubling episode, a senior Boeing engineer,
whose job was to act on behalf of the FAA in issuing certifica-
tions, pushed back against Boeing management’s demands for
less stringent testing of a feature by the new engineers.180 After
initially rejecting the engineer’s call for stricter safety testing so
that he could comply with FAA regulations, Boeing manage-
ment eventually caved to his requests.181 But “[l]ess than a
month after his peers had backed him, Boeing abruptly re-
moved him from the program even before conducting the test-
ing he’d advocated.”182 This incident highlights a consistent
173 Id. at 303.
174 Id. (citing Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 538 n.3 (1988)).
175 Borfitz, supra note 77.
176 See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 538 n.3.
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problem with the Boeing ODA program: “Many engineers, em-
ployed by Boeing while officially designated to be the FAA’s eyes
and ears, faced heavy pressure from Boeing managers to limit
safety analysis and testing so the company could meet its sched-
ule and keep down costs.”183 Boeing’s costs and schedules are
not likely the type of policy considerations envisioned by the
Berkovitz Court.184 However, in the absence of strict, expressly
delineated statutory processes that the FAA is bound to follow in
designating oversight authority, this mode of attack is probably
weaker than one based on the qualified private person
grounds.185
3. Is the Federal Tort Claims Act the Right Tool?
Even if it is possible to sue the FAA under the FTCA, a ques-
tion remains regarding the likelihood that private FTCA suits
against the FAA would be effective in ensuring the FAA is not
beholden to private companies, like Boeing, and that the FAA
performs its duty of ensuring the safety of aircraft without un-
due private influence.186 It has been noted that the FTCA makes
it hard to sue the FAA for negligence and that it would be more
prudent to sue Boeing directly.187 As one aviation lawyer re-
marked, “At the start, middle and end, regardless of the role the
FAA played, Boeing, Boeing, and Boeing is responsible for the
safety of the airplane.”188 Some feel that the role of investigating
the nature of the relationship between the FAA and Boeing is a
task better left to the legislature.189 After all, victims who want to
be made whole can always sue Boeing, which has agreed to set-
tlements of over $1 million for some crash victims.190 However,
if the FAA is susceptible to “capture,” or is already captured, law-
suits against one of the biggest companies in the industry may
help, but would not address the root of the problem. Thus, two
183 Id.
184 See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 538 n.3 (1988).
185 See id. at 547.
186 See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig
Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 804 (1984) (“In the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49
U.S.C. § 1421(a)(1), Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation to pro-
mote the safety of flight of civil aircraft in air commerce.”) (emphasis added).
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questions must be addressed; is the FAA “captured”, and if it is,
could lawsuits pursuant to the FTCA help?
B. AGENCY CAPTURE AND THE FAA
Regulatory agencies, such as the FAA, face the Herculean task
of overseeing a technological domain that seems to constantly
increase in complexity. With limited resources and personnel,
agency cooperation with industry leaders, who often have vastly
superior resources and technical expertise, is an inescapable re-
ality.191 But occasionally, the interests of the private parties sub-
ject to regulation become so intertwined with the agency that
they lead to undue control and domination of the agency’s reg-
ulatory authority. This phenomenon is referred to as agency
“capture” and has “been all but universally seen as a negative
consequence.”192 Agency capture occurs when a private com-
pany, through lobbying or otherwise, usurps the agency’s public
policy considerations in favor of the private company’s own self-
ish interests.193 “It has become widely accepted, not only by pub-
lic interest lawyers, but by academic critics, legislators, judges,
and even by some agency members, that the cooperative over-
representation of regulated or client interests in the process of
agency decision results in a persistent policy bias in favor if these
interests.”194
The FAA is an agency that is widely considered “captured” by
the airline industry.195 This conclusion is supported by findings
of various investigations into the 737 MAX certification pro-
gram. A New York Times report found that many top agency offi-
cials “shuffle[ ] between the government and the industry.”196
Boeing was treated more as a client than as a private party regu-
lated by the FAA.197 Managers within the FAA’s oversight pro-
gram over the Boeing ODA were reportedly pressured to make
sure Boeing met deadlines to deliver the 737 MAX to its custom-
ers.198 Problems encountered by Boeing engineers tasked with
191 See Niles, supra note 55, at 393.
192 Id. at 390.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 See id. at 405.
196 Kitroeff et al., supra note 130.
197 Id.
198 Id.
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certification were not reported to disinterested FAA officials, but
to Boeing executives.199
Concerns about the impartiality of the FAA and fears of its
capture by the industry are not new or unique to the aviation
industry. The rise of the administrative state has naturally led to
an increased number of agencies, and thus increased concern
over agency capture.200 For the FAA in particular, a primary
source of concern stems from what has been referred to as the
FAA’s dual mandate—beyond just regulating airline safety, the
FAA is also tasked with fostering air commerce.201 “[Thus f]rom
its inception, the FAA was given the difficult task of balancing
two interests which might be frequently, if not inherently, in
conflict: the protection of airline safety on one hand, and the
‘fostering’ of successful air commerce, and consequently, the
promotion of airline profitability, on the other.”202
While that language was removed in subsequent amendments
to the statute, the influence of the dual mandate remains.203
While other industries do rely on “audited self-regulation” by
private companies, the FAA is particularly susceptible to “hyper-
influence” by regulated parties since it “relies almost exclusively
on self-regulation.”204 Given that concerns about the influence
of the aviation industry on the FAA stretch back over forty years
and that the prevalence of companies like Boeing in the FAA
certification process has only increased in that time,205 it seems
that the legislature and the agency itself may not be capable of
crafting solutions to the problem. A critical examination of
some of the proposed changes and findings by the JATR reveals
why FTCA suits are a necessary aspect of FAA reform.
In its report on the FAA’s delegation of certification authority
to Boeing, the JATR panel concluded that “in the [737] MAX
program, the FAA had inadequate awareness of MCAS function
which, coupled with limited involvement, resulted in the inabil-
ity of the FAA to provide an independent assessment of the ade-
quacy of the Boeing proposed certification activities associated
with MCAS.”206 This statement alone is rather shocking. The fact
199 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at 29.
200 Niles, supra note 55, at 386–88.
201 Id. at 407.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 408.
204 Id. at 413.
205 Id. at 409.
206 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at VII.
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that the FAA was willing to certify the 737 MAX even though it
could not determine the adequacy of Boeing’s certification ac-
tivites indicates a disturbing level of incompetence or industry
influence—or both—within the FAA. To remedy this, the panel
issued Recommendation R5, “that the FAA conduct a workforce
review of the BASOO engineer staffing level to ensure there is a
sufficient number of experienced specialists to adequately per-
form certification and oversight duties, commensurate with the
extent of work being performed by Boeing.”207 However, given
the Court’s broad understanding of the discretionary function
exemption, the FAA could likely meet this duty by simply stating
that current staffing levels are adequate—it would be acting
within its discretion in making that determination. Even if the
statue were amended to require “adequate” staffing, it would
still be up to the FAA (and by extension, Boeing) to determine
what that means.
The JATR also recommended that “[t]he FAA should review
the Boeing ODA work environment and ODA manual to ensure
the Boeing ODA engineering unit members are working with-
out any undue pressure when they are making decisions on be-
half of the FAA.”208 This would amount to having FAA officials
connected with Boeing determine whether Boeing is exerting
undue pressure on the engineers, and given the broad scope of
the discretionary function exemption, Boeing officials delegated
authority would have the discretion to conclude the engineers
operate free of undue pressure. Other JATR recommendations
involve requiring “holistic, integrated aircraft-level ap-
proach[es]” to certification209—that ODA engineers consider
how adding critical technological systems like MCAS might ef-
fect other processes of the aircraft.210 These recommendations
seem so obvious that it is hard to believe they have not been
considered by the FAA, fortifying contentions that the agency is
subject to industry control, which will only be loosened by bring-
ing FTCA claims against it.
For a captured agency like the FAA, there is very little stand-
ing in the way of allowing the industry to apply undue pressure
absent judicial intervention. The lobbying groups behind the
airline industry are considered some of the most powerful and
207 Id. at VIII.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. at VIII–IX.
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effective in the United States. The FAA is largely run by people
with significant connections to the major airlines, and who seem
to side increasingly with the industry on issues.211 Unfortunately,
the only catalyst for any semblance of change in the FAA tends
to be the public outcry following devastating accidents that cost
hundreds of lives.212 But these incidents are few and far between
and changes are typically not implemented once the outrage
subsides. For example, in response to a catastrophic crash of an
airplane off the coast of Long Island in the late 1990s, the “FAA
implemented several heightened safety measures and organized
a White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.”213
This commission, among other things, proposed thirty-one rec-
ommendations for tightening airport security, especially in the
face of terrorism.214 But those procedures were not seriously im-
plemented by the FAA until after the September 11, 2001 terror-
ist attack.215 Most observers agreed that “had those
recommendations been implemented within the spirit and in-
tent of the commission, the plans to attack on September 11
might have been detected well before they occurred.”216 Al-
lowing FTCA suits to proceed against the FAA for acts outside
the scope of the discretionary function exemption would place
the FAA on notice that it should conduct its duties in accor-
dance with one of its primary purposes—to promote safety.
V. CONCLUSION
In the absence of congressional action amending legislation
to implement oversight requirements and limits on delegation,
the FAA might not curb its own excesses. A slew of small, but
specific amendments could go some way to creating meaningful
change.
First, the statute should require that an impartial FAA engi-
neer have a non-delegable duty to conduct a cursory examina-
tion of a proposed change and make the initial determination
of whether it is considered significant or minor. In the case of
the 737 MAX, the JATR concluded that it was Boeing engineers,
likely under pressure from Boeing management, who made the
determination that a change in MCAS that increased the ability
211 Niles, supra note 55, at 415.
212 Id. at 409.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 410.
215 Id. at 410–11.
216 Id.
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of the system to change the pitch of the aircraft was not signifi-
cant and did not need further FAA review.217 Had the FAA over-
sight engineers seen the change, they could have caught the
mistakes that caused the accidents.218
Along those lines, the statute should mandate that any auto-
mated system that can alter the flight path of an aircraft without
input from the pilot is, by definition, a significant change that
needs to be reviewed independently by FAA engineers. Given
the stakes involved, it makes no sense that a change which can
alter the flight of the aircraft without input could be seen as
anything other than significant. Finally, amending the statute to
require the FAA to retain authority to appoint specific Boeing
engineers who will participate in the ODA program, rather than
delegating that duty to Boeing, is another solution to part of the
problem.
But in the face of Congress’ inaction, the judicial system pro-
vides hope of holding the FAA accountable when delegating au-
thority to private industry leaders like Boeing.
217 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at 13–14.
218 Id. at 14.
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